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Continuous-variable quantum cryptography with an untrusted relay:
Detailed security analysis of the symmetric configuration
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Department of Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom
(Dated: July 2, 2018)
We consider the continuous-variable protocol of Pirandola et al. [Nature Photonics 9, 397–402
(2015), see also arXiv.1312.4104] where the secret-key is established by the measurement of an
untrusted relay. In this network protocol, two authorized parties are connected to an untrusted
relay by insecure quantum links. Secret correlations are generated by a continuous-variable Bell
detection performed on incoming coherent states. In the present work we provide a detailed study of
the symmetric configuration, where the relay is midway between the parties. We analyze symmetric
eavesdropping strategies against the quantum links explicitly showing that, at fixed transmissivity
and thermal noise, two-mode coherent attacks are optimal, manifestly outperforming one-mode
collective attacks based on independent entangling cloners. Such an advantage is shown both in
terms of security threshold and secret-key rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.-w, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Rather than layers of physical security or obscure cod-
ing in the distribution of a classical key [1], quantum
cryptography claims to rely on the fundamental laws of
quantum physics to provide secure quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) [2]. In the simplest scheme, information
is encoded on non-orthogonal states which are transmit-
ted from Alice to Bob via a quantum channel. After
classical procedures of error correction and privacy am-
plification, Alice and Bob are then able to distill shared
secret bits [2]. Any attempt by Eve at gleaning informa-
tion inevitably introduces noise in the quantum channel;
by quantifying this noise, Alice and Bob determine how
much distillation must be applied to make Eve’s infor-
mation negligible or if there is too much noise (breaching
the security threshold) they abort the protocol.
Over the last several decades, QKD has been imple-
mented many times, more recently even in simple net-
work configurations [3–5]. By utilizing an iterated point-
to-point strategy, a secret key may be shared with legit-
imate users on more distant network nodes. This strat-
egy explicitly requires secure and trusted intermediate
relay stations. However, modern communication proto-
cols (e.g., TCP/IP) rely on a more advanced ‘end-to-end
principle’ [6, 7] with simple, unreliable and untrusted re-
lays; any layers of security are provided by the two end-
parties.
A first step in this direction has been done by Ref. [8],
which extended QKD to the mediation of an untrusted
relay, void of quantum sources (e.g., entanglement) and
performing a quantum measurement which generates
secret correlations in remote stations. This idea of
a measurement-based untrusted relay (also known as
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‘measurement-device independence’) has been experi-
mentally implemented with discrete variables [9, 10].
More recently, the use of measurement-based un-
trusted relays has been introduced in continuous-variable
QKD [11] with the aim of exploiting the advantages
of bosonic systems [12, 13] in terms of cheap quantum
sources and highly-efficient detectors. Indeed this pro-
tocol is able to achieve secret-key rates orders of magni-
tude higher than any protocol based on discrete-variable
systems. This is possible thanks to the use of the cheap-
est possible quantum sources, i.e., coherent states, com-
bined with simple linear optics and homodyne detectors
at the relay station. Ref. [11] found that the optimal per-
formances are achieved in the asymmetric configuration
where the relay is close to one of the parties.
In this paper, we deepen the analysis of Ref. [11] con-
sidering the symmetric configuration where the relay is
midway between Alice and Bob. Despite the fact this is
not the optimal setup in terms of rates and security dis-
tances, it is still very important to analyze for potential
applications in network scenarios where two parties are
roughly equidistant from a public server or access point.
Another reason for analyzing this kind of setup is in its
simple analytical formulas for the secret-key rates. Us-
ing these formulas, we can provide a very detailed com-
parison between the most important Gaussian attacks
against the quantum links.
In our cryptanalysis of the symmetric protocol we
clearly show that, at fixed transmissivity and thermal
noise on the links, the optimal eavesdropping strategy
is a two-mode coherent Gaussian attack, where Eve in-
jects quantum correlations in both the quantum chan-
nels leading to the relay. In this attack, these channels
are combined (via beam-splitters) with two entangled
modes, which have been prepared in a suitable Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state. Such a strategy greatly
outperforms the single-mode collective attack based on
two independent entangling cloners which was assumed
in some recent investigations [16–18]. Any such security
2analysis relying on independent attacks on the channels
is therefore incomplete and opens security loopholes.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
describe the setup in the symmetric scenario. In Sec-
tion III we analyze its security and provide a formula
for the key rate. In Section IV we compare the various
Gaussian attacks, identifying the optimal attack and the
corresponding minimum key rate of the protocol. Finally,
in Section V we draw our conclusions.
II. THE PROTOCOL
Let us consider the scenario where Alice and Bob do
not access a direct communication link. Instead they
connect to a perfectly-in-the-middle relay via insecure
quantum links, as shown in Fig. 1(a). The relay is un-
trusted, meaning that it is assumed to be operated by
Eve in the worst case scenario.
The protocol proceeds as follows: Alice and Bob pos-
sess two modes, A and B, which are prepared in coherent
states, |α〉 and |β〉, with randomly-modulated amplitudes
(according to a complex Gaussian distribution with large
variance). They send these modes to the intermediate
relay where the output modes, A′ and B′, are subject
to a continuous-variable Bell detection [19]. This means
that A′ and B′ are mixed on a balanced beam splitter
and the output ports are conjugately homodyned: One
port is homodyned in the qˆ-quadrature with outcome q−,
while the other port is homodyned in the pˆ-quadrature
with outcome p+. Compactly, the measurement provides
the complex outcome γ := (q− + ip+)/
√
2 which is then
broadcast over a public channel.
To understand the working mechanism of the relay,
first suppose there is no loss and noise in the links. In
such a case, we have γ ≃ α−β∗, so that the communica-
tion of γ creates a posteriori correlations between Alice’s
and Bob’s variables. Each party can easily infer the vari-
able of the other. For instance, Alice could compute the
quantity α − γ ≃ β∗ recovering Bob’s encoding β up to
detection noise [11]. This procedure partly recalls the
post-processing of the two-way QKD protocols [20, 21].
Note that Eve’s knowledge of variable γ would be of no
help to extract information on the individual variables α
and β, i.e., we have I(α : γ) = I(β : γ) = 0 in terms of
mutual information [22, 23]. By contrast, as a result of
the broadcast of γ, the conditional mutual information of
Alice and Bob becomes non-zero I(α : β|γ) > I(α : β).
Thus, if Eve wants to steal information, she needs to
introduce loss and noise.
In general, the action of Eve may involve a global
unitary operation correlating all the uses of the pro-
tocols. However, using random permutations of their
data [25, 26], Alice and Bob can always reduce this sce-
nario to an attack which is coherent within the single
use of protocol. This can be a joint attack of both the
links and the relay. The parties can further reduce this
eavesdropping to consider a coherent attack of the links
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) Relay-based protocol performed
in the symmetric configuration with the untrusted relay per-
fectly in the middle between the parties. Alice and Bob pre-
pare coherent states with Gaussianly-modulated amplitudes,
α and β, respectively. The relay performs a continuous-
variable Bell measurement with complex outcome γ := (q−+
ip+)/
√
2, which is publicly broadcast. From the knowledge
of γ each party can infer the variable of the other party.
(b) Entanglement-based representation of the protocol under
two-mode Gaussian attack. Using two beam splitters with
transmissivity τ , Eve injects to ancillary modes, E1 and E2,
prepared in a two-mode Gaussian state with zero mean and
CM in the symmetric normal form of Eq. (2). See text for
details.
only, assuming a properly-working relay, i.e., a relay im-
plementing a continuous-variable Bell detection. In par-
ticular, since the protocol is based on the Gaussian mod-
ulation and Gaussian detection of Gaussian states, the
optimal coherent attack of the links will be based on a
Gaussian unitary interaction [13–15]. See Ref. [11] for
more details about this general reduction of the attack.
III. CRYPTOANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
According to the previous discussion, we can reduce
the attack to a two-mode Gaussian attack against the
quantum links of Alice and Bob. The most realistic im-
plementation of such an attack consists of two beam split-
ters combining the signals with ancillary modes prepared
in a generally quantum-correlated Gaussian state (more
exotic Gaussian attacks may be constructed using other
canonical forms [27]). In particular, we will consider the
symmetric configuration of this attack, where the param-
eters are identical for the two links, so that the perfor-
mances of the protocol are invariant under exchange of
Alice and Bob. In order to analyze this symmetric Gaus-
sian attack, we adopt the entanglement-based (EB) rep-
3resentation of the protocol, where Alice’s and Bob’s en-
sembles of coherent states are simulated using two EPR
states subject to local heterodyne detections.
A. Entangled-based representation
The EB-representation of the protocol is described in
Fig. 1(b). Alice and Bob possess two EPR states, ρaA
and ρbB , with the same covariance matrix (CM) [13]
V(µ) =
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
, (1)
where I = diag(1, 1), Z = diag(1,−1) and µ ≥ 1.
By applying heterodyne detections to the remote
modes, a and b, Alice and Bob prepares coherent states,
|α〉 and |β〉, on the other EPR modes, A and B, respec-
tively. In particular, their amplitudes, α and β, are mod-
ulated according to a complex Gaussian distribution with
variance ϕ := µ−1, that we take to be very large ϕ≫ 1.
Modes A and B are then sent to the relay for detection.
B. Symmetric two-mode Gaussian eavesdropping
Alice’s and Bob’s modes A and B are mixed with an-
cillary modes, E1 and E2, respectively. This is done by
means of two beam-splitters with the same transmis-
sivity τ . The ancillas belong to an environmental set
{E1, E2, e} in the hands of Eve, and the reduced state
of E1 and E2 is a zero-mean Gaussian state σE1E2 with
CM in the symmetric normal form
VE1E2 =
(
ωI G
G ωI
)
, G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
. (2)
Here ω is the variance of the thermal noise injected in
the beam splitters, while G accounts for the quantum
correlations between the two ancillas. (The various pa-
rameters ω, g, and g′ satisfy simple physical constraints
imposed by the uncertainty principle [28, 29]).
The output modes, A′ and B′, are subject to the
continuous-variable Bell detection (with the outcome
broadcast), while Eve’s output modes, E′1 and E
′
2, to-
gether with all the other ancillary modes e are stored
in a quantum memory, which is detected by an optimal
coherent measurement at the end of the protocol.
Note that we may consider different transmissivities,
τA and τB, for the beam splitters, and an asymmetric
CM with different thermal variances, ωA and ωB. This
is the general asymmetric case considered in Ref. [11].
However, when the relay is midway between the two par-
ties, the amount of loss and noise present in the links is
realistically expected to be identical. In other words, it
is reasonable to consider here a symmetric attack as the
one previously described, which has
τA = τB := τ, ωA = ωB := ω . (3)
Thanks to this symmetry, we can reduce the number of
parameters and derive a simple analytical expression for
the secret-key rate, which allows us to perform a detailed
analysis of the various specific symmetric attacks which
are possible against our protocol. In particular, we can
easily study the performances of these attacks in terms of
the correlation parameters, g and g′, and identify the op-
timal one which minimizes key rate and security thresh-
old. Furthermore, due to the symmetry, Alice and Bob
can be interchanged, which implies that there is no dif-
ference between direct and reverse reconciliation [13]. In
other words, we can consider a unique secret-key rate for
the protocol (assuming one-way classical communication
for error correction and privacy amplification).
C. Secret-key rate
Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice is the
encoder of information (variable α) while Bob is the de-
coder, so that he post-processes his variable β to infer
α. In the EB-representation, these variables are infor-
mationally equivalent to the outcomes of the heterodyne
detections [11]. To derive the rate, we note that the
Bell detection at the relay and the heterodyne detections
of the two parties commute with each other. For this
reason, we can equivalently compute the rate from the
conditional state ρab|γ of modes a and b after the com-
munication of the outcome γ. The rate is given by [11]
R = Iab|γ − IE|γ , (4)
where Iab|γ is Alice and Bob’s conditional mutual infor-
mation, while IE|γ is Eve’s Holevo information [23] on
Alice’s variable (which can be computed from the state
of the output ancillas).
Since all output modes are in a global pure state and
the various detections are rank-1, we can write [11]
IE|γ = S(ρab|γ)− S(ρb|γα), (5)
where S(.) is the von Neumann entropy [23], computed
on the post-relay state ρab|γ of Alice and Bob, and the
double-conditional state ρb|γα of Bob, conditioned to re-
lay’s and Alice’s detections (computable from ρab|γ).
D. Computation of the key rate
Both the mutual information Iab|γ and Eve’s Holevo
entropy IE|γ can be computed from the post-relay state
ρab|γ , in particular, from its CM Vab|γ . Imposing the
symmetry conditions of Eq. (3) in the general expression
4of Vab|γ computed in Ref. [11], we derive
Vab|γ =
(
µI 0
0 µI
)
− τ(µ
2 − 1)
2
× (6)
×


1
τµ+λ − 1τµ+λ
1
τµ+λ′
1
τµ+λ′
− 1
τµ+λ
1
τµ+λ
1
τµ+λ′
1
τµ+λ′

 ,
where
λ := (1− τ)(ω − g), λ′ := (1− τ)(ω + g′). (7)
Note that Eq. (6) represents a particular case of the gen-
eral CM of Eq. (A10), which is obtained in the Appendix,
where non-unit quantum efficiencies of the detectors are
also included.
Now, we can easily compute [13] the symplectic spec-
trum of eq.(6) in the limit of large modulation µ ≫ 1,
obtaining
ν1 →
√
λµ
τ
, ν2 →
√
λ′µ
τ
. (8)
Then, entropy term S(ρab|γ) in Eq. (5) can be computed
using the function
h(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
(9)
→ log e
2
x+O
(
1
x
)
for x≫ 1. (10)
Thus, we have
S(ρab|γ) = h(ν1) + h(ν2)→ log
e2
4τ
√
λλ′µ. (11)
To compute S(ρb|γα) we derive the double-conditional
CM Vb|γα. We put Eq. (6) in the block-form
Vab|γ =
(
A C
C
T
B
)
, (12)
and we apply a partial gaussian heterodyne measurement
on Alice’s remote mode a,given by [13, 19, 24],
Vb|γα = B−CT (A+ I)−1C, (13)
which gives
Vb|γα =
(
µ− (µ2−1)τ
τ(µ+1)+2λ 0
0 µ− (µ2−1)τ
τ(µ+1)+2λ′
)
. (14)
For µ≫ 1, its symplectic eigenvalue is given by
ν →
√
(τ + 2λ)(τ + 2λ′)
τ
, (15)
and we have S(ρb|γα) = h(ν). We can then compute
Eve’s Holevo information, asymptotically given by
IE|γ = log2
e2
√
λλ′µ
4τ
− h
[√
(τ + 2λ)(τ + 2λ′)
τ
]
. (16)
Alice and Bob’s conditional mutual information Iab|γ can
be computed from the classical CMV(α, β|γ) = (Vab|γ+
I)/2 describing their outcomes. After simple algebra, we
get the asymptotic expression
IAB|γ = log2
τµ
4
√
(τ + λ)(τ + λ′)
. (17)
As a result, we computed the following asymptotic secret-
key rate for the symmetric Gaussian attack
Rsym = log2
[
τ2
e2
√
λλ′(τ + λ)(τ + λ′)
]
+ h
[√
(τ + 2λ)(τ + 2λ′)
τ
]
, (18)
which is function of the parameters τ , ω, g and g′.
A complete analysis of the performances of the scheme
in presence of non-ideal experimental conditions is de-
scribed in Appendix A
IV. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE
SYMMETRIC ATTACKS
For fixed transmissivity τ and thermal noise ω affecting
each link, there are remaining degrees of freedom in the
two-mode Gaussian attack. These are given by the corre-
lation parameters g and g′, which can be represented as
a point on a ‘correlation plane’ (see Fig. 2). Each point
of this plane describes an attack (with different amount
and kind of correlations) to which it corresponds a spe-
cific key rate according to Eq. (18). Here we provide a
detailed comparison between these attacks, showing how
the optimal coherent attack greatly outperforms the col-
lective attack based on independent entangling cloners.
Because of the symmetry, we have a simple character-
ization of the set of possible Gaussian attacks which are
accessible to Eve. These correspond to points (g, g′) such
that [28, 29]
|g| < ω, |g′| < ω, (19)
ω |g + g′| ≤ ω2 + gg′ − 1. (20)
Among all these accessible attacks, those satisfying the
further condition
ω2 − gg′ − 1 ≥ ω|g − g′| (21)
are separable attacks (σE1E2 separable), while those vio-
lating Eq. (21) are entangled attacks (σE1E2 entangled).
See Fig. 2 for a numerical representation. In particular,
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Correlation plan for a symmetric Gaus-
sian attack. Given τ and ω (here set to 2), the attack is fully
specified by the two correlation parameters (g, g′), whose ac-
cessible values are represented by the non-white area. In par-
ticular, the inner darker region represents the set of separable
attacks (σE1E2 separable), while the two outer and lighter
regions represent entangled attacks (σE1E2 entangled). The
numbered points represent the specific attacks described in
Sec. IV.
we can identify the following attacks:
Collective attack. This is the simplest attack, repre-
sented by point (1) in Fig. 2, i.e., the origin of the plane
(g = g′ = 0). This corresponds to using two identical and
independent entangling cloners with transmissivity τ and
thermal noise ω. In fact, we have σE1E2 = σE1 ⊗ σE2 ,
where σEk (k = 1, 2) is a thermal state with variance ω,
whose purification ΦEkek is an EPR state in the hands
of Eve.
Separable attacks. Within the separable attacks we
can identify points (2), (3), and (4) in Fig. 2. These are
characterized by the condition |g| = |g′| = ω − 1 and
represent the separable attacks with the highest correla-
tions. In particular, points (2) correspond to the cases
g = g′ = ω − 1 or g = g′ = 1 − ω, point (3) corresponds
to g = −g′ = ω − 1, and point (4) to g = −g′ = 1− ω.
EPR attacks. Finally, points (5) and (6) in Fig. 2 are
the most entangled attacks, where Eve’s ancillas E1 and
E2 are described by an EPR state. Point (5) is the ‘pos-
itive EPR attack’ with g = −g′ = √ω2 − 1, while (6) is
the ‘negative EPR attack’ with g = −g′ = −√ω2 − 1.
The latter turns out to be the optimal attack against the
protocol.
We now compare the performances of the previous at-
tacks in Figs. 3 and 4. In Fig. 3 we fix the transmissivity
τ = 0.9 and we study the corresponding rates R as func-
tion of the thermal noise ω. In Fig. 4 we plot the security
thresholds. These are given by the condition R = 0, and
they are expressed in terms of maximum tolerable ther-
mal noise versus transmissivity ω = ω(τ).
Our analysis identifies “good” and “bad” entanglement
for the security of the protocol. Good entanglement
R
ω
(1)
(3)
(5)
(2)
(6)
(4)
FIG. 3: (Color online) Secret-key rate R (bits) versus thermal
noise ω for the various symmetric attacks (1)-(6) classified in
Sec. IV and displayed in Fig. 2. Link-transmissivity is set to
τ = 0.9. Note that the negative EPR attack (6) is the optimal
attack minimizing the rate of the protocol.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Security threshold (R = 0) ex-
pressed as maximum tolerable thermal noise ω versus link-
transmissivity τ . We compare the various symmetric attacks
(1)-(6) classified in Sec. IV and displayed in Fig. 2. The neg-
ative EPR attack (6) is the optimal corresponding to the low-
est security threshold. Also note the peculiar inversion of the
threshold for the positive EPR attack (5), for which the rate
is positive for values of thermal noise above the threshold.
refers to the entangled attacks in the bottom right area
of Fig. 2, with g = −g′ > 0, of which the attacks (3)
and (5) are border points. This entanglement is good
because it injects correlations of the type qˆE1 ≈ qˆE2 and
pˆE1 ≈ −pˆE2, therefore helping the Bell detection (which
projects on qˆA′ ≈ qˆB′ and pˆA′ ≈ −pˆB′). As a result, Eve
actively helps the key distribution.
This is evident from the performance of the positive
EPR attack (5) both in terms of rate (Fig. 3) and se-
curity threshold (Fig. 4). In fact, from Fig. 3, we see
that the rate is increasing in the thermal noise ω and, in
Fig. 4, we see a peculiar inversion of the security thresh-
old so that thermal noise above the threshold is tolerable.
These features are typical of all entangled attacks with
ω − 1 < g ≤ √ω2 − 1 and g′ = −g, corresponding to
the segment of points between (3) (excluded) and (5)
(included). In Figs. 3 and 4, these attacks have curves
which are intermediate between those of (3) and (5).
By contrast, bad entanglement refers to the entangled
6attacks in the top left area of Fig. 2, with g = −g′ < 0
and having the attacks (4) and (6) as border points. This
entanglement is instead bad because it injects correla-
tions of the type qˆE1 ≈ −qˆE2 and pˆE1 ≈ pˆE2 , which are
opposite to those established by the Bell detection. In
this case, Eve decreases the correlations between Alice’s
and Bob’s variables, and she is able to eavesdrop more
information, with the optimal strategy achieved by the
negative EPR attack (6) as clear from the rates of Fig. 3
and the security thresholds of Fig. 4. The asymmetric
version of this attack is optimal in case of asymmetric
setups [11].
By comparing the curves (6) and (1) in Figs. 3 and 4,
we clearly see the substantial advantage given by this
optimal attack with respect to the standard collective
attack based on independent entangling cloners. Analyt-
ically, the minimum key rate associated with the optimal
attack is given by
Rmin = h
(
τ + 2λopt
τ
)
+ log2
[
τ2
e2λopt(τ + λopt)
]
, (22)
with λopt = (1 − τ)(ω +
√
ω2 − 1). One can easily check
this is numerically much less than the rate of the collec-
tive attack
Rcoll = h
[
τ + 2(1− τ)ω
τ
]
+ log2
{
τ2
e2(1− τ)[τ + (1 − τ)ω]ω
}
. (23)
Thus, the security analysis which is valid for one-way
continuous-variable QKD protocols [13], and based on
the study of collective (single-mode) entangling-cloner at-
tacks, cannot be applied to our relay-based protocol. For
this reason, the studies provided by Refs. [16, 17] are in-
complete and cannot prove the unconditional security of
the relay-based (measurement-device independent) QKD
with continuous variables.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have provided a detailed analysis of
the relay-based QKD protocol of Ref. [11], considering a
completely symmetric setup under the action of symmet-
ric attacks. Despite the fact that this particular case does
not represent the optimal configuration of the scheme,
still it is important for its potential implementation in
network scenarios. Furthermore, the symmetry condi-
tions allow us to greatly simplify the cryptoanalysis and
derive simple analytical results.
Thanks to this approach, we have been able to provide
a very detailed classification of the symmetric attacks
against the protocol, characterizing the different possi-
ble strategies in terms of their correlation properties. At
fixed transmissivity and thermal noise, we have identi-
fied the optimal symmetric attack which corresponds to
a coherent attack where the ancillas are maximally en-
tangled with a specific type of EPR correlations (negative
EPR attack). In particular, this attack greatly outper-
forms the standard collective attack based on indepen-
dent entangling-cloners, which is therefore unsuitable for
assessing the security of this kind of protocol (contrary to
the claims of other analysis [16, 17]). This also confirms
the results of Ref. [11] which were given in the general
case of asymmetric setups.
Finally our work clarifies the crucial role of quantum
correlations in assessing the security of QKD protocols
which are based on untrusted relays. Further studies
may include the extension of this protocol to thermal-
QKD [21, 30, 31], with the aim of using different wave-
lengths of the electromagnetic field, e.g., in mixed tech-
nology platforms using both optical/infrared and mi-
crowave carriers.
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Appendix A: Extension to experimental
imperfections
In this appendix we analyze the role of experimental
imperfections computing the key-rates and the security
thresholds in the presence of Bell detectors with non-
ideal quantum efficiencies. We also study finite-size ef-
fects connected with finite Gaussian modulations [13],
and the role played by the non-ideal efficiency of the
classical reconciliation codes [32]. We show that, also
in the presence of realistic experimental limitations, the
optimal eavesdropping is given by the two-mode coherent
“negative-EPR attack”.
1. Post-relay covariance matrix for non-ideal Bell
detectors
We generalize Eq.(6) to include detectors’ efficiencies
by placing two beam splitters with transmissivities η and
η′, as illustrated in Fig. 5. To preserve the purity of
the global (Alice-Bob-Eve) state, the non-detected sig-
nals are sent to Eve’s quantum memory (this is the as-
sumption to make in the worst-case scenario, since the
relay is untrusted and Eve can control the loss of the
detectors).
We follow the general approach given in Ref. [19]. We
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Untrusted relay with inefficient de-
tectors. Two additional beam splitters, with transmissivities
(η, η′) are placed in front of the ideal detectors. One output
from each beam splitter is sent to the detectors for measure-
ments. The other outputs are sent to Eve’s quantum memory.
write the total CM in the block form
V =
(
Vab C
C
T
B
)
, (A1)
where the block
B =
(
B1 D
D
T
B2
)
, (A2)
describes the modes sent to the relay, A′ and B′. These
are processed by the balanced beam splitter and then
measured. In our case it is easy to verify [11, 19] that
the blocks B1,B2 and D take the following expressions
B1 = B2 = [τµ+ (1− τ)ω]I, (A3)
D=(1− τ)G, (A4)
where I =diag(1, 1) and G =diag(g, g′).
In Eq. (A1) the sub-matrix Vab describes the joint
quantum state of remote modes a and b, while the block
C = (C1C2) is a rectangular matrix accounting for the
correlations between the remote modes and the transmit-
ted ones, i.e., A′ and B′. In particular, we compute
C1 =
( √
τ(µ2 − 1)Z
0
)
, C2 =
(
0√
τ(µ2 − 1)Z
)
.
(A5)
Applying Eq. (74) from Ref. [19] to Eq. (A1), we ob-
tain Alice and Bob’s CM conditioned to the relay Bell
measurement. This is given by
Vab|γ = Vab−
1
2 detγ(η, η′)
∑
i,j=1,2
Ci
(
X
T
i γ(η, η
′)Xj
)
C
T
j ,
(A6)
where
X1 =
(
1
1
)
, X2 =
(
1
−1
)
. (A7)
Here the quantum efficiencies of the detectors, simulated
by the beam splitter transmissivities η and η′, are con-
tained in the symmetric matrix
γ(η, η′) =
(
γ1(η) γ3
γ3 γ2(η
′)
)
. (A8)
In the case of a Bell detection the matrix γ(η, η′)
can explicitly be computed, according to Eqs. (54-59)
of Ref. [19]. In particular, its entries take the form
γ1(η) = γ1 +
1− η
η
,
γ2(η
′) = γ2 +
1− η′
η′
,
γ3 = 0 (A9)
where γ1 = τµ+(1−τ)(ω−g) and γ2 = τµ+(1−τ)(ω+g′)
are easily obtained from Eq. (A3) and (A4), using the
formulas of Ref. [19].
After simple algebra we derive the post-relay CM in-
clusive of the quantum efficiencies
Vab|γ =
(
µI 0
0 µI
)
− τ(µ
2 − 1)
2
×
×


1
γ1(η)
− 1
γ1(η)
1
γ2(η′)
1
γ2(η′)
− 1
γ1(η)
1
γ1(η)
1
γ2(η′)
1
γ2(η′)

 .
This CM can be rewritten in the form
Vab|γ =
(
µI 0
0 µI
)
− τ(µ
2 − 1)
2
×
×


1
τµ+λ(η) − 1τµ+λ(η)
1
τµ+λ′(η′)
1
τµ+λ′(η′)
− 1
τµ+λ(η)
1
τµ+λ(η)
1
τµ+λ′(η′)
1
τµ+λ′(η′)

 ,
(A10)
where 

λ(η) = (ω − g)(1− τ) + 1−η
η
,
λ′(η′) = (ω + g′)(1− τ) + 1−η′
η′
.
(A11)
Note that Eq. (A10) could have been computed directly
from Eq. (6) by applying the transformations [34]
λ→ λ(η), λ′ → λ′(η′). (A12)
2. Asymptotic generalized key-rate
From the previous CM we can write the sub-matrix
describing Bob’s mode
Vb|γ =
(
µ− τ(µ2−1)2[τµ+λ(η)]
τ(µ2−1)
2[τµ+λ′(η′)]
)
. (A13)
8Then, by applying Eq. (13) to the generalized CM of
Eq. (A10), we derive the doubly-conditional CM of Bob,
conditioned to both relay’s and Alice’s detections, i.e.,
Vb|γα(η, η
′) =
(
µ− τ(µ2−1)[τ(µ+1)+2λ(η)]
µ− τ(µ2−1)[τ(µ+1)+2λ′(η′)]
)
.
(A14)
We can now derive the symplectic spectra of the CMs
of Eq. (A10) and (A14). We find simple analytical ex-
pressions in the limit of large modulation. For Vab|γ we
have the symplectic eigenvalues ν1(η) and ν2(η
′), while
for Vb|γα we have ν(η, η
′). These eigenvalues can be ob-
tained by applying the transformations of Eq. (A12) to
the Eqs. (8) and (15).
Using these spectra, we can compute the corresponding
total and conditional von Neumann entropies and there-
fore the Holevo bound. In the limit of large modulation,
Eve’s Holevo information becomes
IE|γ(η, η
′) = log2
e2
√
λ(η)λ′(η′)µ
4τ
− h
[√
[τ + 2λ(η)][τ + 2λ′(η′)]
τ
]
, (A15)
which extends Eq. (16) to arbitrary efficiencies η and η′.
Similarly, we can extend the formula for Alice and
Bob’s mutual information, which here becomes
IAB|γ (η, η
′) = log2
τµ
4
√
[τ + λ(η)][τ + λ′(η′)]
, (A16)
for large modulation. Combining the previous results, we
derive the asymptotic key-rate in the presence of detector
inefficiencies
Rsym(η, η
′) = log2
[
τ2
e2
√
λ(η)λ′(η′)[τ + λ(η)][τ + λ′(η′)]
]
+ h
[√
[τ + 2λ(η)][τ + 2λ′(η′)]
τ
]
, (A17)
which clearly extends the formula given in Eq. (18).
3. Role of the imperfections on key-rate, security
thresholds and achievable distances
In this section we study in detail the combined role of
the various experimental limitations and imperfections,
confirming the main findings presented in the main body
of this paper. We compute the key-rate and the secu-
rity thresholds considering not only the realistic quan-
tum efficiency of the detectors, but also the use of a finite
Gaussian modulation and the non-ideal reconciliation ef-
ficiency provided by realistic codes for error correction
and privacy amplification.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The key-rate R (bits) is plotted versus
thermal noise ω for µ = 10 (SNU) (top-panel) and µ = 70
(bottom-panel). Other parameters are τ = 0.9, β = 0.95 and
η = η′ = 0.98. We compare two eavesdropping strategies:
The collective one-mode entangling cloner attack g′ = g = 0
(dotted black line) and the two-mode “negative EPR” attack
g = −g′ = −
√
ω2 − 1 (continuous black line). We see that
the key-rate of the two-mode attack is always lower than that
of the one-mode attack. For comparison, we have also plotted
the performances in the case of ideal reconciliation (β = 1),
ideal detectors (η = η′ = 1) and large modulation (µ ≫ 1).
These ideal performances are represented by the red curves,
dotted for the one-mode attack and continuous for the two-
mode attack.
a. Secret key rate
In order to extract a secret key, the honest parties must
process their correlated data in stages of perform error
correction and privacy amplification. This data process-
ing is today implemented with a limited efficiency β ≤ 1,
for instance β ≃ 0.95 ÷ 0.97 [32, 33]. To include this
limitation, we have to multiply Alice and Bob’s mutual
information by β, and consider the realistic key-rate [13]
R(β, µ, τ, ω, g, g′, η, η′) = βIAB|γ − IE|γ , (A18)
where IAB|γ and IE|γ are now computed considering fi-
nite modulation µ besides non-ideal detector efficiencies
η and η′ (clearly these quantities must tend to Eqs. (A15)
and (A16) in the limit of large modulation).
In general, the mutual information can be computed
from the formula IAB|γ =
1
2 log2Σ, where Σ is defined in
Ref. [11]. Eve’s Holevo information can be computed us-
ing the formula of the von Neumann entropy S = Σxh(x),
with h(x) defined in Eq. (9) and applied to the numeri-
cal symplectic eigenvalues of the CMs given in Eqs. (A10)
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FIG. 7: (Color online) We plot the security threshold ω =
ω(τ ) for µ = 10 (top panel) and µ = 70 (bottom panel). Other
parameters are β = 0.95 and η = η′ = 0.98. We compare the
two-mode negative EPR attack (continuous black lines) and
the one-mode entangling cloner attack (dotted black lines).
Red curves refer to the ideal case β = η = η′ = 1 and µ≫ 1.
and (A14). In Fig. 6, we plot the key-rate of Eq. (A18)
as a function of the thermal noise ω for two values of the
Gaussian modulation µ = 10 (top) and µ = 70 (bottom)
vacuum shot noise unit (SNU), and choosing τ = 0.9,
η = η′ = 0.98 and β = 0.95. We see that the key-rate
of a negative EPR attack is clearly lower than that of a
collective one-mode attack. This behavior is generic by
varying the previous parameters.
b. Security thresholds and achievable distances
Here we study the impact of the experimental limita-
tions on the security thresholds, comparing the two-mode
optimal attack with one-mode collective attack. The se-
curity threshold is obtained by solving the equation
R(β, µ, τ, ω, g, g′, η, η′) = 0. (A19)
In this equation, we fix the values of the Gaussian mod-
ulation (µ = 10 or 70), the reconciliation efficiency
(β = 0.95), and the quantum efficiencies η = η′ = 0.98.
Then, for each attack, we can write the security thresh-
old as ω = ω(τ). The comparison is provided in Fig. 7,
where we see that the threshold of the optimal two-mode
attack is always lower than the threshold of the one-mode
collective attack.
The previous analysis can be performed by express-
ing the transmissivity in term of distances. In fact, we
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FIG. 8: (Color online) This figure shows the security thresh-
olds as ω = ω(d), where d is the distance in km, assuming
the loss rate of 0.2 dB/Km. As in previous figures we com-
pare the two-mode negative EPR attack (solid lines) with
the one-mode entangling-cloner attack (dotted lines). In
the top panel, the red curves refer to the ideal conditions
β = η = η′ = 1 and µ ≫ 1. The black curves refer to the
non ideal case β = 0.95, η = η′ = 0.98 and µ = 70 (SNU).
The bottom panel shows the degradation of the performance
as we increase the modulation from µ = 70 (black curves) to
µ = 1000 (green curves), for β = 0.95, η = η′ = 0.98.
may consider τ = 10−
0.2
10
d, where d is the distance in km,
assuming the standard loss rate in fibre of 0.2dB/Km.
The achievable distances are shown in Fig. 8. We see
that moving from the ideal conditions (red curves, with
β = η = η′ = 1 and µ ≫ 1) the performances deteri-
orate. All others curves are obtained for realistic rec-
onciliation efficiencies β = 0.95, and detectors efficien-
cies η = η′ = 0.98. The top panel compares the ideal
thresholds with the case µ = 70 (black), while in the bot-
tom panel we show the degradation of the performances
while increasing the modulation from µ = 70 (black) to
µ = 1000 (green).
It is interesting to note the effect of the reconciliation
efficiency on the optimal modulation variance. For values
of β < 1, the optimal modulation is not infinite. In fact,
for the realistic value considered here, β = 0.95, we have
a range of finite modulations 30 . µ . 70, for which the
performances are improved.
c. Discussion
Here we summarize some important aspects emerged
from this further analysis. First, we have shown that
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positive key-rates are still achievable over the range of
metropolitan distances in the presence of various exper-
imental limitations. Second, the negative-EPR attack,
already identified to be the optimal attack in the ideal
case (see main text) continues to be the most powerful
eavesdropping strategy also considering realistic experi-
mental conditions, i.e., finite modulation, non-ideal rec-
onciliation and non-ideal detectors. Third, the degrada-
tion of the performances of the protocol does not come
from the finite modulation (e.g., we checked that values
as low as µ = 10 are still acceptable) but mainly from
the quantum efficiencies of the detectors, η and η′, and
the reconciliation efficiency β of the classical codes.
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